Diálogo
Volume 3

Number 1

Article 3

1998

From Brave Men to Wards: Cuba and Cubans through the pages of
The New York Times
Rafael Tarragó

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/dialogo
Part of the Latin American Languages and Societies Commons

Recommended Citation
Tarragó, Rafael (1998) "From Brave Men to Wards: Cuba and Cubans through the pages of The New York
Times," Diálogo: Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/dialogo/vol3/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Latino Research at Digital
Commons@DePaul. It has been accepted for inclusion in Diálogo by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

DESDE LA AMERICA NUESTRA

B y Rafael T arrago

From Brave M

CUBA AND CUBANS THROUGH THE PAGES OF

ost New York C ity newspapers sup

M

ported C uban independence from the
beginnings o f the insurrection in Feb

ruary 1895, and the same was true o f newspapers in the
M idw est o f the U .S. C uban exile clubs and their A m er
ican sympathizers in southern Florida and in the north
east seaboard prom oted public support for the cause of
C uban independence, and financed expeditions that
brought food and am m unition to the C uban Liberation

Army.
T he purpose o f this essay is to analyze U .S. opinion
about the Cuban insurgents and events in C uba as they
were reported on the pages o f The New York Times from
October, 1897 to October, 1898; and to use the result
ing chronology as a sounding board for questioning old
verities concerning issues such as the position towards
U .S. intervention in C uba and the efficacy o f the Teller
A m endm ent to the U .S. Congress Jo in t Resolution of
April 18, 1898 in preventing the annexation o f C uba by
the U .S.

Wreckage of U.S.S. Maine
Photo by Charles E. Doty

en to Wards

THE NEW YORK TIMES IN 1 8 9 8

1898, a New York paper; a day after

H o m e R u le in C u b a vs. B ra v e a n d
D e s p e ra te M e n
T

h e home rule decree issued on November 28 by the
Spanish Queen Regent was accepted as a reality by
The New York Times, and as an honest attempt by
the Madrid government to give Cuba everything in the way
of local self-government.12 In “Cuban Autonomy,” pub
lished on December 4, however, it warns, “It is in vain that

we may hold that any measure ought’ to pacify Cuba which
does not in fact accomplish that result.” On December 15,
this paper reported the surrender of the insurgent Cuban
leader General Sanguily, and on the following day it pointed
out the issuance by General Máximo Gómez, general-inchief of the Cuban Liberation Army, of a proclamation stat
ing that anyone approaching any company of the Liberation
Army with peace proposals not based on the independence
of Cuba would be executed. In January 28, 1898, General
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Gómez proved true to his word, approving the execution of
Colonel Joaquin Ruiz, a Cuban-born officer of the royal
army sent as an emissary to him by Governor General
Ramón Blanco to inform the insurgents of the program of
home rule for Cuba.
On January 1, 1898, home rule and universal suffrage
went into effect in Cuba, and The New York Times reported
“Big Conspiracy in Cuba.” This article asserted that there
had been demonstrations in the Cuban cities of Havana and
Matanzas against the home rule government established only
that day. It concluded with the report of crowds in Matan
zas cheering for U.S. President William McKinley and the
annexation of Cuba to the U.S. The same issue has an article
titled “New Cuban Cabinet in Power,” where the Spanish
Minister to the U.S. is quoted saying that with the new gov
ernment, “there will be full realization of a Government of
Cuba by the Cubans.” On January 2, the article, “Cuban
Cabinet Sworn In,” describes the swearing-in ceremony of
the provisional Cuban autonomous government at Havana.
Indeed, Cuban it was, because as part of his reconcilia
tion policy, Governor General Blanco appointed only
Cuban-born men, which angered many European-born
Spaniards. In “The Riots in Havana,” on the editorial pages
of January 15, The New York Times reports violent protests
against the new regime at Havana on January 12. These dis
turbances were controlled swiftly by Governor General Blan

co, but The New York Times described them as a mark of the
chronic crisis of Spain, and the failure of home rule in Cuba.
It is also said in this article that not a single insurgent
had surrendered, implicitly denying events reported by this
newspaper earlier concerning the surrender of some insur
gents. This article concluded that the Cuban autonomous
government was a farce into which Spanish rule in Cuba had
degenerated, and that it was time to consider “the exigency
of further action by the U.S. before the inhabitants of the
wretched island had completed its devastation or their
mutual extermination.” The autonomous government
installed on January 2, 1898 was remarkably well-qualified.
It was not a group of planters, but a group of intellectuals,
lawyers, and men of affairs, like Francisco Zayas, Laureano
Rodriguez, Rafael Montoro, and José Maria Galvez; howev
er, their high professional and human caliber would never be
guessed from reading The New York Times.

T h e C rise s o f F e b ru ary : M e n in a S t a te o f O p e n
a n d D e a d ly H o s t i l i t y
n the front page of The New York Times for January 24
it was reported that several U.S. battleships were gath
ering in Key West under Admiral Sicard. By that date the
battleships New York, Indiana, Massachusetts, Iowa, and

O

Texas had arrived off the bar; and the battleships Mont
Palma, Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New
gomery, Detroit, and Maine joined them later. Claiming to
York City, talks of Colonel Lee as someone who will send
be concerned about the ability of Governor General Blanco
reports to Washington that will promote the Cuban insur
to control the riots of January 12, at Havana, U.S. Consul
gent cause.14 From the moment of his arrival in Cuba, Lee
General Colonel Fitzhugh Lee wrote to Secretary of State
was in touch with insurgent leaders, and carried messages for
Day on January 13, asking that
them. He courted the insur
U.S. battleships be sent to
gents and sent Washington neg
" H e (C o l. L e e ) a l w a y s
Havana to protect U.S. citizens.
ative reports about the possibili
Mr. Day obliged by having the
ties for successful Cuban home
e m p h a s i z e d in h is r e p o r t s
U.S. Maine sent to Havana on
rule under the Spanish monar
January 24. Colonel Lee wrote
to W a s h in g to n th a t a ll th e
chy long before it was proposed
to Mr. Day on February 4,
by the Spanish government. It
S p a n ia r d s a n d th e " b e tte r
“Ship or ships should be kept
is not unjust to say that he went
here all the time now.”13 That is
to Havana as a convinced
c la s s " o f C u b a n s w a n te d
how the U.S. Maine arrived
annexationism. He said that
a n n e x a tio n ."
unannounced in Havana, where
most Cubans wanted annexation
the embarrassed authorities
and he did his best to have this
made up a story about a courtesy visit to be reciprocated by
prophesy fulfilled. Although he curried favors for the insur
the Spanish battleship Vizcaya in New York.
gents—on February 15, 1898, he forwarded to President
Colonel Lee had gone to Havana as Consul General
McKinley a letter from General Gomez—he always empha
sent by President Cleveland in April, 1896. In a letter of
sized in his reports to Washington that all the Spaniards and
June 13, 1896 to Andres Gómez, Don Tomás Estrada
the “better class” of Cubans wanted annexation.15 On Janu
Nets drying near Morro Castle, Habana, 1890s
CHARLES E. DOTY

CHARLES D. SIGSBEE

ary 21, 1898, Colonel Lee sent a letter to
Secretary of State Day with a devastating
analysis of the autonomous constitution
of Cuba which emphasized its flaws and
did not take into account that it was a
vast improvement over what the status of
the island had been until then. It is pos
sible that the source that gave those
accounts of a failed Cuban autonomous
government to The New York Times was
the man who at that time was supposed
to be the American best informed about
Cuba, U.S. Consul General Colonel
Fitzhugh Lee.
On February 8, 1898, the New York
Journal published a private letter written
by the Spanish minister to the U.S.,
Enrique Dupuy de Lome, to his friend
Sigsbee had an American flag brought to the Maine, hoisted and then hauled
Antonio Canalejas, in Havana. His letter
down to half-mast.
almost caused a rupture of diplomatic
relations between the U.S. and Spain. In
terrible explosion, concluding that none of the wounded
it, Dupuy de Lome called President McKinley a low politi
men were able to give an explanation. The following day
cian, and intimated that Spains Sagasta government had not
the Maine was front-page news again. In “The Maine Dis
been sincere in its relations with the Cuban autonomous
aster,” The New York Times reported that the loss was due to
government or the U.S. This affair made the front page of
an accident, that spontaneous combustion in coal bunkers
The New York Times on February 9. In “De Lome on the
was a frequent peril to the magazine of warships.
President,” it reproduced the contents of the letter, and told
Could it be a coincidence that these two incidents hap
that it probably had been stolen from Mr. Canalejas by a
pened
so close to each other? The attempt by Cuban insur
Cuban agent while he was in Havana, and that the Delega
gents to provoke a conflict between the U.S. and Spain on
tion of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York had
February 8 failed. Could it be that the Cuban insurgents
given it to the Journal. In the editorial pages of February
were
behind the events of February 15? That was suggested
15, the Journal endorsed the action of the Cuban insurgents,
in 1898, and General Máximo Gómez was quick to label the
“Men in a state of open and deadly hostility.” The editors of
accusation “one more proof of Spanish perfidy.” Exactly one
The New York Times concluded this piece with the words,
hundred years after the explosion of the U.S.S. Maine, the
“War is a miserable work, and if stealing a letter or a thou
Spanish edition of The Miami Herald published an article by
sand will shorten it, the letters should be stolen.” Mr.
the Cuban journalist Carlos Alberto Montaner, where he
Dupuy de Lome resigned, and the Spanish government
asks “Who benefitted from the explosion of the Maine?” It
apologized for his behavior, assuring the U.S. government
is self-evident to him that it was the Cuban insurgents who
that it meant to implement the statutes of home rule grant
wanted the U.S. to intervene as allies against the royal
ed to Cuba. Thus the publication of the Dupuy de Lome
army. 7 The historian Guillermo G. Calleja has arrived at
letter did not cause the crisis that the Cuban insurgents in
the same conclusion. His thesis (derived from the work of
the U.S. wanted.
Jorge Navarro Custin) shows that the Cuban insurgents
But within a week a greater disaster occurred. On Feb
placed a mine on the Maine designed by the engineer Fed
ruary 15, the U.S.S. Maine blew up in Havana harbor. A
erico Blume, who had contacted the Cuban agent Aristides
crisis was prevented after the Dupuy de Lome letter affair,
Agüero in Perú.18 Calleja points out that Captain Sigsbee of
but the explosion of the Maine became a cause belli, even
the U.S.S. Maine reported to have heard two explosions the
though it was never proven that a Spaniard had blown it up.
night of the event. This supports the thesis of an external
On February 16, The New York Times had on its front page
explosion which brought about a second one that blew up
the article, “The Maine Blown Up,” where it reported the
11
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the magazine of the battleship. According to Calleja, the
manuscript collection of Julio Lobo, Cuban magnate, con
tained sworn statements by some of the Cuban insurgents
who blew up the Maine.19
The first reaction to the explosion of the Maine by
the U.S. authorities was that it had been an accident.
Then annexationists like Colonel Lee accused Spain of the
deed. After a Spanish request for a joint investigation was
declined, two investigating commissions were established:
one conducted by the U.S. Navy, and the other by author
ities in Havana. The Havana commission concluded that
the explosion had been caused by internal combustion.
The U.S. Navy commission reported on March 21 that
there were two explosions: the explosion of a mine
beneath the hull that blew the keel upward, and the
resulting detonation of the powder stored above. The
Spanish government proposed to submit both reports to
an arbitration commission, but the U.S. government
refused. After the explosion of the U.S.S. Maine, the
intervention of the U.S. in Cuba was assured.

IN Q U IR E R , 1 8 9 8

T he U .S . R o a d t o A r m e d I n terven tio n in
C u b a : “ B eggars S h o uld N ot B e C h o o se r s”

n spite of the threat by generals Gomez and García,
Cuban insurgents continued defecting. On March 15,
The New York Times reported in the article, “Cubans Kill
False Leaders,” that Cuban insurgent leaders Cayito,
Alvarez, and Nunez, had been killed by other insurgents
while on their way to tender their submission to the
Cuban autonomous government. But most insurgent gener
als did not pact with the autonomous government after the
explosion of the Maine. U.S. intent to intervene in Cuba
was apparent after the U.S. Congress requested $50 million
on March 9, for national defense. The insurgents were
encouraged to assume that the Cuban Republic in Arms
would be recognized and that the Cuban Liberation Army
would be considered “belligerent” by the official declarations
made by the U.S. government, and by the apparent support
of their cause by the people of the U.S. On March 28, The
New York Times reported, “It can be stated upon high
authority that there has been no abatement of the Presidents
intention to see that the war is terminated upon terms that
will render the Cuban people practically free. It is not
believed that they will accept anything less, nor that the
Americans will be satisfied if we should encourage a settle
ment that would not be acceptable to the Cubans.”
In The New York Times of April 6, 1898, a U.S. Senator
is quoted saying, “No one will pretend to say that the status

I

John Bull: "it's really most e xtra ord ina ry w hat training w ill do.
W h y only the other da y I though that man unable to
support himself."

of the Republic of Cuba has ever approached anything like
the condition of perfection of government that the southern
Confederacy attained. It has no seaports, no U.S. consul...
It has not, as a matter of fact, controlled the island of
Cuba.” This Senator concluded that if the U.S. was to
intervene for the pacification of Cuba it should do so free
handed. On April 7, the article “Junta Members Excited”
quoted Mr. Rubens saying, “The action of the U.S., if it
should declare that the Cubans are not in a position to be
independent after having a week ago notified Spain that she
must recognize the independence of the Cubans as a prereq
uisite to any further negotiations would place the U.S. gov
ernment in a peculiar light.” On this occasion, Mr. Rubens
said that the government of the Cuban Republic, and the
Cuban Liberation Army, would reject the intervention of the
U.S. in Cuba unless it should be preceded by a recognition of
its independence. But Don Tomás Estrada Palma, and his
second-in-command, Gonzalo de Quesada, denied Mr.

Rubens’ statement. Afterwards Mr. Rubens explained him
self. He said that his statement of the previous day meant
that the Cuban Liberation Army would fight against U.S.
annexation, but that as far as he was concerned, if Cubans
opted for annexation once free from Spain, it was “all well
and good.” On the same day Mr. Quesada reversed himself
as well, now threatening that if the U.S. intervened without
recognizing Cuba’s independence, it would be making a vir
tual declaration of war against the insurgents as well as
against Spain. But the
author of the article,
“The Junta Members
“ It c a n b e s t a t e d
Excited,” well judged

Cuban Republic in Arms or the Cuban Liberation Army. As
a matter of fact, this renunciation did not set any deadline
for granting sovereignty over Cuba to her people. Horatio
Rubens claimed later that Teller had proposed the amend
ment at his urging.21 According to John L. Offner, the lob
byist for the Cuban insurgents Janney and McCook received
$2 million in 6 percent Cuban bonds for securing this dubi
ous guarantee of Cuban independence.22 Hugh Thomas
suggests that Teller was acting on behalf of Midwestern beetsugar interests concerned
about competition from
Cuban cane-sugar if Cuba
u p o n h ig h
became a U.S. territory and
the situation, conclud
her products could enter the
a u th o r ity th a t th e r e h a s b e e n n o
ing that article with the
continental U.S. free of
a b a t e m e n t o f t h e P r e s i d e n t 's
words “beggars should
duty.23 The McKinley
not be choosers.”
i n te n ti o n t o s e e t h a t t h e w a r is
administration’s initial hos
On April 11, Presi
tility to the final form of the
te r m in a te d u p o n te r m s t h a t w ill
dent McKinley
Joint Resolution gave way to
r e n d e r th e C u b a n p e o p le
addressed a message to
approval as it realized that,
Congress concluding
because it did not recognize
p ra c tic a lly f r e e .”
that U.S. intervention
the Cuban Republic or the
in Cuba had become
belligerency of the Cuban
— T h e N e w Y o rk T im e s , M a r c h 2 8 , 1 8 9 8
necessary, and asked
Liberation Army, the Teller
for the authorization to
Amendment did not commit
take measures to end the war on the island, and on April 12,
the U.S. to grant Cuba independence in their time.24
The New York Times reported that while opinions differed on
this message as a whole, a majority of those questioned by
T h e U .S. a n d t h e C u b a n I n s u r g e n ts : O n e R ace,
the paper said that the people of Cuba ought to be free. On
H u m a n k in d ... O n ly G o o d N a tio n s a n d B a d
April 17, The New York Times reported that the previous
night the U.S. Senate had concluded a three-day debate. A
n May 6, The New York Times reported the opening of
resolution was voted on jointly by the U.S. Congress on
the Cuban Autonomous Parliament in Havana on
April 18, 1898 stating that the Cuban people ought to be.
May 5. This article describes the solemn oath taken by the
free and independent; that the U.S. and its government
deputies to defend the sovereignty of the Spanish crown in
demanded the immediate renunciation by Spain of sover
Cuba, the promise of further concessions to the Cubans
eignty over Cuba and the immediate evacuation of the Span
made by Governor General Ramón Blanco, and the partici
ish government and its armed forces from the island; it gave
pation in these ceremonies by the hereto anti-home rule
the U.S. president authority to use armed force in order to
para-military corps known as Voluntarios. On May 8, The
implement the above; and it declared that the U.S. had no
New York Times also reported the definite organization of the
desire or intent of attaining sovereignty in Cuba, except for
Cuban Chamber of Deputies, and five days later it reported
its pacification, and expressed the intent, once that goal had
in the article, “Cuban Congress at Work,” that the first
been achieved, to grant sovereignty and governance over
political step taken by the Cuban Congress after it was con
Cuba to her people.20 On April 20, President McKinley
stituted had been to appoint a commission to send—
signed this joint resolution, and sent an ultimatum to the
through the Spanish government to European powers—a
Spanish government.
protest against the intervention of the U.S. in Cuban affairs.
The last clause in the Joint Resolution of the U.S. Con
The Cuban Senate was also constituted and Mr. José Bruzón
gress was an amendment made through the offices of Sena
was elected as its president.
tor Teller of Colorado. Cuban insurgents in the U.S. and in
Reading The New York Times for 1898 one receives the
the island made a lot out of it, but it did not recognize the
impression that the Cuban insurgents welcomed U.S. inter
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Republic in Arms supported the intervention unconditional
vention in Cuba. Except for the demand that the U.S. rec
ly as early as April 28, 1898.32 On May 1, 1898, General
ognize the Cuban Republic in Arms before it intervened
Garcia received a delegation from the U.S. Army, one of
made by Mr. Rubens in New York, all the Cuban leaders
whose
members carried a telegram from Don Tomás Estrada
accepted U.S. intervention unconditionally. As a matter of
Palma, the Delegate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in
fact, General Máximo Gómez had sent a letter to President
New York, and because of that telegram, and because he
McKinley on February 9, 1897, asking him to employ the
consulted the Cuban civil government, it has been argued
weight of his authority to stop Spain.25 He had a similar let
that General Garcia cooperated with the U.S. armed forces
ter forwarded to McKinley by Consul Lee on February 15,
following orders of the government of the Cuban Republic
1898/ In the past half century it has become common
in Arms.33 But before the Americans went to him with the
opinion that the Cuban insurgents were winning in their
telegram of introduction from
struggle against the royalist
Don Tomás Estrada Palma,
forces and loyalist Cubans, but
General Garcia had expressed
reading the war diaries of Gen
“R e a d in g T h e N e w
Y o rk
his desire to cooperate uncon
eral Máximo Gómez one gets a
T
i
m
e
s
f
o
r
1
8
9
8
o
n
e
ditionally with them in a note
different impression. General
dated April 18, 1898.34 This
Máximo Gómez admits his des
re c e iv e s th e im p re s s io n
decision may have been moti
perate situation on February 28,
vated
by General Garcias per
to the pages of his diary—after
th a t th e C u b a n in s u r g e n ts
ception of the Cuban
the desertion of seventeen men,
autonomous government as far
his force had been reduced to
w e l c o m e d U .S .
superior to that of the Cuban
thirty men. On March 1, his
Republic in Arms as a civil
force was taken by surprise and
i n te r v e n t io n in C u b a .”
working government, and
barely escaped capture.27
therefore more likely to be
Proponents of the theory
courted by the Americans once the latter had forced the
that a conquering Cuban Army of Liberation was cheated of
Spanish crown to cede its sovereignty over Cuba.35
victory by U.S. intervention will admit that a few insurgents
In a letter of May 1, 1898, to vice-president Méndez
were in favor of intervention, but only among those in exile,
Capote, General Garcia announced his taking Bayamo, and
and some will add that those were former Autonomists. It is
claimed that other cities in Oriente were going to fall soon,
true that the propaganda activities of the New York delega
but he did not answer desperate calls for help from General
tion of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (the New York Junta)
Gómez three weeks later, on May 2 1.36 In a letter dated
helped precipitate a war between the U.S. and Spain.28 Hor
June 12, to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, General Samp
atio Rubens was scolded by the Cubans at the headquarters
son refers to a letter from General Garcia to the American
of the Junta in New York after he declared to The New York
General Miles assuring that officer that he regarded his wish
Times that the Cuban insurgents would oppose armed inter
es and suggestions as orders.
vention by the U.S. in Cuba unless it recognized the inde
It seems that Enrique Collazo made a fair assessment of
pendence of the Cuban Republic.29 But it was not only
the conduct in 1898 of the New York Delegation, the civil
Cubans in the U.S. who wanted the U.S. to intervene in
government of the Cuban Republic in Arms, and of the two
Cuba. Insurgent Cubans on the island did too, and they
major leaders of the Cuban Liberation Army. He wrote in
had their reasons. General Gómez was not winning battles
1905 that “delivered to the U.S. by the civil government and
or holding towns on May 2, 1898, when he sent a message
the Delegation of the Cuban Revolutionary Party abroad,
asking for assistance to General Sampson through the offices
Cubans did not expect liberty to come from their army but
of the U.S. vice-consul in Sagua; and on May 17, he was
from the whim or will of the President of the U.S.”37In his
unable to take the town of Jicotea after it was abandoned by
work, Los Americanos en Cuba, General Collazo criticizes the
government troops, because he was out of ammunition and
civil government of the Cuban Republic in Arms and the
waiting to receive some from “the chief of the allied army. 30
commanders-in-chief of the Cuban Liberation Army for not
On May 21, he wrote in his diary: “if reinforcements from
negotiating with the Spanish authorities in Cuba and the
Oriente do not arrive, it is doubtful the campaign will be
Cuban autonomous government after the unilateral Spanish
successful here. 31
cease fire of April 11. Instead they gave their unconditional
Bartolomé Masó and the government of the Cuban

have written President McKinley and General Miles thank
ing them for the American intervention in Cuba.”

“Cubans did not expect
liberty to come from their
army but from the whim
or will of the
President of the U.S.”

T he U.S. in C u b a : C u b a ’ s I n d epen d en c e ...
F r o m S pain

t seems puzzling that a war to liberate Cubans from Span
ish oppression began in the Philippines, but the destruc
tion of the Spanish fleet at Cavite on May 1, 1898, was the
first engagement in this war between the U.S. and Spain.
Like in Cuba, there was an independence movement in the
Philippines, and on April 24, 1898, the Filipino leader,
Emilio Aguinaldo, had conversations with the U.S. consul in
Singapore. On May 19, Aguinaldo joined Commodore
Dewey, commander of the U.S. fleet in Manila Bay. He
established his headquarters at Cavite, assumed dictatorial
powers, and began operations against the armed forces of the
Spanish government.40 It is likely that Aguinaldo was given
verbal statements of support for the independence of the
Philippines by the U.S. consul in Singapore, E. Spencer
Pratt, and by Commodore Dewey.41 On June 12, Aguinaldo
declared the independence of the Philippines, and on June

I

-Gen. Collazo

3, 1 8 9 6
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support to the U.S. government that refused to acknowledge
them.38 But they had reasons to suspect the good faith of
what they saw as reforms made in desperation since the
Abarzuza’s reforms, accepted unanimously by the Cortes in
February 1895, had never been implemented—although I
will dare say that Gomez’ desire to avenge his son and Gar
cias pique were the main reasons for their unwillingness to
deal with Spain in a way that allowed her to save face. Like
wise, the exiles had decided that anything was preferable to
dealing with Spain. General Blanco had success obtaining
the surrender of some insurgent officers, but without the
surrender of either Garcia or Gómez, peace was impossible
in the short term. In his campaign diary Máximo
Gómez records at least three attempts by Governor
General Blanco to win him over. Unrecorded in
Gomez’s diary is a letter from General Blanco dated
April 22, which Horatio Rubens translated together
with Gomez’s answer in his memoir of Cuba, The
Story o f Freedom (1937).39
In his letter of April 22, 1898 to Máximo
Gómez, Governor General Blanco warned that Ameri
cans were of a different ethnic origin and wanted to
exterminate Cubans because of their Spanish blood
with their blockade of the island; which acts were
damaging to both Cubans and Spaniards and would
finish the human destruction that mutual depreda
tions during the war of independence had begun. He
proposed an alliance of both armies at Santa Clara,
where the Cuban insurgents would receive arms from
the royal army to fight the Americans, suggesting that
once the war was over, Spain would welcome Cuba as
a new Spanish-speaking nation of the same religion
and blood. General Máximo Gómez answered, indig
nant, that Cubans and Spaniards could never live in
peace together on Cuban soil, and that he knew of
only one race, humankind; that for him there were
The noble hero (to the heavy villain): "Stand b a c k there , g o t darn
only good nations and bad, and up till then he had
ye!
If you force this thing to a fifth act, rem em ber that's where I
reasons for admiring the U.S. He concluded saying, “I
g it in m y w o rk !"

23, he decreed the establishment of a provisional govern
describes Cubans, “scattering like guinea pigs. 46 Roosevelt
ment with himself as president. Unlike General Garcia in
was particularly unimpressed by the appearance of the
Cuba, he made no offer to place himself under American
Cuban Liberation Army at the moment he landed in Cuba,
orders.42
when, he says, “At Daikiri we found hundreds of Cuban
When war broke out in April 1898, the immediate
insurgents, a crew as utter tatterdemalions as human eyes
action of the U.S. naval squadrons stationed at Key West
ever looked on, armed with every kind of rifle in all stages of
since February was to blockade Cuban harbors. On the
dilapidation. It was evident at a glance, that they would be
front page of The New York
no use in serious fighting, but it
Times on May 7, the capture on
was hoped that they might be
A m e ric a n s w e r e o f a
the previous evening of the
of service in scouting. From a
d if f e r e n t e th n ic o rig in a n d
French steamer Lafayette, off
variety of causes, however, they
Havana harbor while trying to
turned out to be nearly useless,
w a n te d to e x te r m in a te
run this blockade, was reported.
even for this purpose, so far as
C u b a n s b e c a u s e o f th e ir
The U.S. did not begin
the Santiago campaign was con
S p a n is h b lo o d w ith th e ir
military operations in Cuba,
cerned." 47 Ironically, Colonel
however, until June, 1898, a
Roosevelt praises the “Spanish
b lo c k a d e o f th e is la n d ...
month after it began them in
guerrillas,” unaware that this
— G o v e rn o r G en . B la n c o
Asia. On June 2, General Miles
force in the royal army in Cuba
sent a message from Tampa to
was overwhelmingly Cuban-born."
General Calixto García, second-in-command of the Cuban
army, in charge of forces in eastern Cuba, and within a week
On July 4, the small Spanish fleet, which had been
the Cuban insurgent general replied from his base near
trapped inside Santiago’s bottle-necked harbor, attempted to
Bayamo that his forces would actively assist the landing of
escape, and was sunk in the effort. The city of Santiago
the U.S. Army, and that he regarded Miles’ “wishes and sug
would not capitulate unconditionally though, and negotia
gestions as orders.” No formal agreement had been pro
tions began between the Spanish commander of the city,
posed or effected between Miles and Garcia, but the latter’s
Jose Toral, and U.S. Army commander General Shafter. The
response implied that he was voluntarily placing himself and
latter feared that investing Santiago would be very costly in
his troops under American direction and control.43 A land
human lives, and also that a long siege would allow the
ing of U.S. marines occurred at Guantánamo Bay. However,
spread of tropical diseases among his unacclimated men.49
a massive landing of 17,000 troops did not occur until June
On July 14, General Toral formally surrendered the troops
22 at Daikiri, following a meeting between Garcia and U.S.
of his army in the city as well as all government troops and
Army Commander General William R. Shafter. This U.S.
divisions in the eastern province of Cuba. The U.S. made
expeditionary force had the assistance of the Cuban Libera
the commitment to repatriate all the soldiers from Spain
tion Army, who had also carried out a diversionary feint at
who would want to return.50 The terms of surrender stipu
Cabañas. In addition, the mere presence of local insurgent
lated that incumbent civil officers and local constabulary
forces acted as a constraint upon the movement of royalist
authorities were to be ratified in their positions, and that all
troops throughout the military division of Santiago de
residents of the province passed directly under the authority
Cuba.44
and protection of the U.S.51
The Cuban Liberation Army made important contribu
In the article “Santiago and After,” The New York Times
tions to the Santiago campaign, but U.S. troops soon devel
on July 17, 1898, encouraged the conquest of Puerto Rico
oped an attitude of contempt for their nominal allies. In his
because “no better time would be chosen for that capture
war account, The Rough Riders (1899), Colonel Theodore
than the moment at which the Spanish Minister of War is
Roosevelt says, “There was a Cuban guide at the head of the
talking of the retention of that island as an indispensable
column, but he ran away as soon as the fighting began; two
condition of peace.” It concluded that “the intolerable nui
American reporters where there, two men, who did not run
sance which the war was undertaken to abate cannot be per
away.”45 This dismissal of Cubans as cowardly is one of
petuated in Puerto Rico,” and that “Spanish rule must be
many negative comments about the courage and fighting
banished completely and unconditionally from our hemicaliber of the insurgents as reflected in Theodore Roosevelt’s
CONTINUED ON PAGE 18
memoirs. In his account of fighting at El Caney, Roosevelt

find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern civi

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 16
sphere.” These words echo what Theodore Roosevelt said
later in The Rough Riders: “I preached with all the fervor and
zeal I possessed, our duty to intervene in Cuba, and to take
this opportunity of driving the Spanish from the Western
World. 52 But in Santiago de Cuba the U.S. regulars frater
nized with their erstwhile enemies, the Spaniards. Officers
and privates in the U.S. Army and Navy could be seen in
the city together with Spaniards of their own rank. A lieu
tenant in the U.S. Army later reminisced, “I met many of
the Spanish officers in the restaurants of the city, and I must
admit that they were, as a rule, capital fellows, kindly dis
posed, hospitable, and very gentlemanly. 53 The Spaniards
reciprocated the feelings of the Americans for them. Before
departing for Europe, the Spanish private, Pedro Lopez de
Castillo, wrote a letter of appreciation to the American
Army which was signed by 11,000 Spanish soldiers. The
Spanish soldiers wished the Americans “all happiness and
health in this land which will no longer belong to our dear
Spain, but will be yours, who have conquered it by force and
watered it with your blood;” and concluded, “these people
are not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will
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lized communities. 54
General Shafter excluded General Garcia from the peace
negotiations, and the insurgent army from capitulation cere
monies. On July 14, Garcia learned that his forces would
neither share in the municipal administration of Santiago
nor receive control of Cuban territory. He demanded from
Shafter a clarification of the status of Santiago and learned
that the Cuban Liberation Army would not be permitted
into the city. He refused the personal invitation to attend
the capitulation ceremonies at Santiago extended to him by
Shafter, and after breaking publicly with the Americans, he
forwarded to General Máximo Gómez a formal protest of
American actions accompanied by his resignation.55 General
Shafter answered General Garcias protest, and reminded
him that the war was between the U.S. and Spain.56 On
July 26, The New York Times reported in the article “The
Cuban Complaints” the circumstances surrounding the dif
ferences between General Garcia and General Shafter at San
tiago. This article concludes with the words, “in our view
there is at present no government of Cuba, but there is a
municipal government of Santiago de Cuba,” and “to keep
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1868

1892

September 23
Manuel Rojas organized Separatist Party,
pledged to create independent Republic
of Puerto Rico as part of uprising known
as Grito de Lares. His plantation in town
of Lares became headquarters for likeminded revolutionaries who would push
for split from Spain.

J a n u a ry 5
José Marti formed El Partido Revolu
cionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary
Party) organized first in New York and
Philadelphia. Soon spread to Tampa and
Key West.

October 10
Carlos M. Céspedes issued Grito de Yara
initiating Ten Years' War in Cuba, the
independence movement that served as
forerunner of 1895 Insurrection and
Spanish-Cuban War.
1833
M a rc h 22
Spain abolished slavery in Puerto Rico.

Charles D. Sigsbee
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Party-New York worked tirelessly for rev
olution, inspired by José Marti, main
tained by various voices for Revolution.
1897
Spain bowed to U.S. pressure to improve
relations with colonies: agreed to
autonomous constitution for Puerto Rico.

189S
February 24
Cuban independence movement (Ejército
Libertador de Cuba) issued Grito de
Baire, declaring Independencia o Muerte
(Independence or Death), as revolution
ary movement in Cuba began. Quelled
by Spanish authorities same day.
A p ril 10
José Marti and Máximo Gómez Báez
returned to Cuba to fight for indepen
dence; Gómez to serve as military leader
of new revolution. Cuban Revolutionary

Ramón Blanco

1898
J a n u a ry 1
Spain grants limited autonomy to Cuba.
February 15
U.S.S. Maine explodes in Havana Har
bor.
A p ril 19
U.S. Congress by vote of 3 11 to 6 in the
House and 42 to 35 in the Senate adopt
ed Joint Resolution for war with Spain. It

Máximo Gómez

Cuban troops out was a necessity,” because “when our men
are compelled to shell our allies in order to induce them to
desist from killing prisoners, we have had sufficient notice of
what would be the result of letting them lose upon a captive
town. 57 In the same issue the article, “The Future of Cuba,”
ponders the intention as declared in the Joint Resolution of
Congress to leave the government and control of the island
to its people, but that it might be that Cubans wished to
exercise their right of control to become U.S. citizens.
Hostilities between the U.S. and Spain ended formally
on August 12—although the capture of Manila by U.S.
forces was staged on August 13. Since the Cuban insurgents
were not signatories to the peace protocol, insurgent armies
continued operations, and the U.S. appealed to the Delega
tion of the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York to call
them to order. Don Tomás Estrada Palma, the Delegate,
accepted the peace protocol, and his decision was subse
quently accepted by the civil government of the Cuban
Republic in Arms.58 Talk of renewing the war against the
U.S. went on among the Cuban insurgent armed bands, but
they had neither weapons nor supplies, nor the monies to
purchase them, because those came to the insurgents

through the Cuban Revolutionary Party juntas in the U.S.59
On August 13, General García was dismissed by the civil
government of the Cuban Republic in Arms for establishing
a military dictatorship in eastern Cuba, and in early Septem
ber it authorized the disbandment of the entire eastern army.
In late September, the civil government called for a National
Assembly to meet at Santa Cruz del Sur, and on October 23,
it formally dissolved itself and invested the Santa Cruz del
Sur Assembly as the provisional supreme authority of the
Republic of Cuba.60
General H. L. Lawton replaced General Shafter as
provincial governor in eastern Cuba, and upon his arrival in
Cuba, he had a conference with General García, where he
convinced the Cubans that the U.S. intended to honor the
terms of the Joint Resolution, but that Cuban cooperation
was essential to the success of the congressional pledge. By
September 27, García was giving his support to the Ameri
cans because he despised the Santa Cruz Assembly more.
His denunciation of the provisional government and his
endorsement of U.S. authorities in Cuba served to legitimize
the refusal by the latter to recognize the authority of the
Santa Cruz Assembly.61 On October 1, 1898, The New York

Cub an -A m erican War
included the Teller Am endm ent (dis
claim ed an y intention b y U.S. to exercise
jurisdiction o r control over Cuba except
in a pacification role, prom ised to leave
the island as soon as w a r was over.

M iles issued p u b lic proclam ation in
Ponce
stating purpose o f U.S. invasion was to
b ring Puerto Rico a "banner o f free
d om ."

April 25
W a r form ally declared between Spain
a n d U.S.

June, 10
U.S. M arines la nd a t Guantánamo,
Cuba.

July 3
Spanish fleet attempts to leave Santiago
Bay. A ll ships destroyed, 3 5 0 left dead,
16 0 wounded.
Jul y 2 8
Duque de A lm o d o va r d el Rio called for
U.S. annexation o f Cuba.

Nelson A . M iles

N ovem b er 10
U.S. does not recognize the Cuban
G ov./A ssem bly o f Representatives o f the
Revolution, w hich included M a jo r G ener
a l C alixto G arcía. U.S. instead stated it
h ad declared w a r on Spain a n d a ll o f its
possessions because o f destruction o f
battleship U.S.S. M aine a n d other acts
against U.S.

December 10
Treaty o f Paris signed. Spain renounced
a ll rights to Cuba, allow ed an indepen
dent Cuba, ceded Puerto Rico a n d G uam

Tomas Estrada Palma

to U.S. gave up possessions in West
Indies, a n d sold Philippine Islands for

$20, 000, 000.
1899
January 1
Spanish forces left Cuba.

1900
April 12
U.S. Congress passed the Foraker Act,
establishing civilian governm ent in P.R.
under U.S. control, provid ed fo r elected
House o f Representatives on island, but
not fo r vote in W ashington.

May 1
W ith inauguration o f Gov. Charles H.
Allen, the U.S. civilian governm ent o f
Puerto Rico begins.

W illia m D ay

In the article “An Envoy in Dis
guise” on October 9, The New York
Times chastised Cuban supporters of
the Cuban autonomous government,
because Mr. Rivero, editor of the senior
Havana daily El diario de la Marina,
was in New York seeking a rapproche
ment between Cuban supporters of
home rule under the Spanish crown
and Cuban exiles in New York who
supported Cuban independence. The
New York Times wondered how much
credence the Cubans in New York
would give to “the myth that the
Autonomists are anything else than a
group of Spaniards who for years have
On August 13, General García was dismissed by the civil government of the Cuban
been the worst of foes to the real patri
Republic in Arms for establishing a military dictatorship in eastern Cuba.
ots of the island.” This article con
cludes that the pretense of an autonomous Cuban govern
(home rule) Party was the only Cuban political group
ment had been revived for the plain purpose of embarrassing
opposed to U.S. intervention in Cuba in that fateful
the pending negotiations between the U.S. and Spain, and
year.
that the disguised royalists were posing as the representatives
By November 1898, the U.S. authorities in Cuba
of a phase of Cuban sentiment.
had become arbiters of contending factions among the
The fact is that, despite the predictions of The New York
Cuban insurgents. In that month the Santa Cruz
Times since October 1897, the Cuban autonomous govern
Assembly sent a commission to Washington D.C., and
ment continued functioning after the war of the U.S. with
General Garcia also traveled to the U.S. in order to
Spain began. On June 22 (p. 1: 5), in the article “Galvez
present a case for its dissolution. On December 29,
Hopes for Spain,” The New York Times reported an address
General Gómez broke what had been a long silence to
of the Cuban Prime Minister, where he said that he would
address the remains of the Cuban Liberation Army,
rather see heavens fall than an invasion of Cuba by a foreign
appealing for reconciliation and unity. Calixto García
army. At the Cuban Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Galvez had
had died that month in the U.S., and Don Tomás
repeatedly said that home rule was not a regime to benefit
Estrada Palma suggested to the U.S. authorities to give
the Cuban-born Creole, nor the European-born only, but
Gómez some official attention. In January of 1899
for all the inhabitants of the island of Cuba. It is puzzling
President McKinley sent a special representative to
that one of the better informed newspapers in the U.S. did
General Máximo Gómez, who accepted to cooperate
not know that the Cuban autonomous government contin
in disbanding the Cuban Liberation Army, and dis
ued operating outside of eastern Cuba after the capitulation
tributing $3 million to the insurgent soldiers.63 Soon
of Santiago in July, and of the cessation of hostilities
after, the Santa Cruz Assembly denounced Gomez’s
between Spain and the U.S. in August. It existed until the
actions, and threatened to deprive him of the moral
end of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba on December 31,
authority necessary to implement the dissolution of
1898.62 Whatever individual former Autonomists may have
the Liberation Army. But the U.S. Military Governor
said or done after 1898, the fact is that the Cuban Liberal
of Cuba, Brooke, dissolved the Assembly by decree,

COURTESY: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Times reported that while former U.S.
Consul General at Havana Fitzhugh
Lee avowed that Cuba would secure its
independence and be fitted for it under
a “not long guardianship...,” this
seemed somewhat premature confi
dence.

COURTESY: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Shafter said, “This war, as you
well know, is between the U.S.
j?
and Spain alone. 67
It is likely that without
U.S. armed intervention in
1898
become established in Cuba,
and eventually Cuba would
have become independent
peacefully. But instead of a
peace between Cubans, a
peace treaty between the U.S.
and Spain was signed in Paris
on December 10, 1898.68
One may dare say that the
unconditional cooperation
Reenactment of the signing of the peace protocol, August 12, 1898
that generals Gomez and Gar
cia gave to the U.S. interven
and General Gómez, acting under the authority of the U.S.
tion in Cuba is a classic case of decision making flawed by
government, disbanded the Cuban Liberation Army.64
personal motives, and Cuban historiography since Roig de
These events clarified that U.S. intervention in the Cuban
Leuchsenring has been flawed by the awful consequences
war of independence evolved into a Spanish- American
that come from lying to oneself, by refusing to acknowledge
War.65
the actions of the patriot generals candidly, without lessen
ing the grave consequences of what was at least a serious
C o n c lu s io n s
tactical error.
From October 1897 to October 1898, the opinions
uban historian Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring debunked
expressed in the editorials and in the reporting of The New
the myth that Cubans received independence from the
York Times about Cuba and the Cubans changed consider
U.S. in his monograph Cuba no debe su independencia a los
ably. In 1897 this newspaper applauded the reluctance of
Estados Unidos (1950), but in this work he devised his own
the Cuban insurgents to accept anything less than indepen
myth of a Cuban Liberation Army on the road to victory.66
dence from Spain. Throughout the year 1898 the negative
He was instrumental in bringing about an official proclama
opinion that The New York Times held of Spain did not
tion of the Cuban Academy of History designating the War
change, and its editorials on the Cuban autonomous govern
of the U.S. with Spain a “Spanish-Cuban-American War,” a
ment were consistently pessimistic. Also consistent through
concept that, in my opinion, ignores the fact that the U.S.
out the period covered in this essay, the sources of The New
government never granted belligerent status to the Cuban
York Times in Cuba would report that the “best people” in
Liberation Army, that the U.S. armed forces marginalized
the island favored its annexation to the U.S. But in the lat
the Cuban army as soon as they were established in Cuba
ter part of 1898, there was a considerable change in opin
(never treating the Cuban insurgents as allies), and that, for
ions about Cubans and Cuban independence. By April,
all practical purposes, the intervention of the U.S. in Cuba
Cuban insurgents demanding a commitment to Cuban
in 1898 was part of a war of the U.S. with Spain which
independence from the U.S.— as it threatened intervention
began at Manila Bay in April 1898. Furthermore, if the
in Cuba—were reminded by The New York Times that beg
Cuban Liberation Army was on its road to victory in early
gars should not be choosers. On July 26, this newspaper
1898, why did its General-in-Chief, Máximo Gómez,
expressed doubts about the capability of Cubans for self-gov
request assistance from the President of the U.S. through the
ernment, and suggested that Cubans might want to become
offices of U.S. Consul General Fitzhugh Lee on February 15?
U.S. citizens. Under Spain it encouraged the Cuban insur
Victorious generals do not request assistance unconditionally.
gents to intransigence— as brave men—but under the U.S.
The way things seem to have actually been is best described
it encouraged them to acquiesce, to become wards.
■
by General Shafter’s answer to General Garcias protest.
Turn to page 40 for the footnotes to this article.
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